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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
HOWARD RAYMOND RICE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20040702-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for possession of a clandestine drug laboratory, a 
first degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37d-4, -5(l)(d)-(f) (West 2004), 
and unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8 (West Supp. 2005), in the Fifth Judicial District Court, Iron 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Philip Eves presiding.1 This Court has jurisdiction 
of this appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-3 (2)(j) (West 2004). 
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Was the evidence sufficient to prove that defendant was not entrapped where 
defendant approached the confidential informant for a methamphetamine precursor and 
1
 Because no changes to code sections relevant to the issues in this case have been 
made since the time the offenses were committed, the State cites to the latest edition of 
the code. 
thereafter disregarded police admonitions by acting illegally without official authorization? 
When reviewing a jury verdict, this court views all the facts and reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict. State v. Torres, 2000 UT 100, f 
2, 16 P.3d 1242, 1243. Unless the evidence viewed in such a light establishes beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Rice was entrapped, the Court must affirm the conviction. State v. 
Martinez, 848 P.2d 702,706 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), cert denied, 862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993).2 
STATUTES 
The following statutes are attached at Addendum A: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8 (West Supp. 2005); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37d-4 (West 2004); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37d-5 (West 2004); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-303 (West). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with possession of a clandestine drug 
laboratory, a first degree felony (count 1); unlawful possession of a precursor chemical (red 
phosphorous), a second degree felony (count 2); and unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance (methamphetamine), a third degree felony (count 3). R2-1. Defendant moved to 
2
 Defendant asserts that the issue of entrapment was preserved by his submission 
of an entrapment instruction. Aplt. Br. at 1 (citing R122). Because defendant does not 
challenge the instruction, but instead claims the evidence was insufficient to prove that he 
was not entrapped, a jury instruction, without more, is insufficient to preserve his claim. 
See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ff 16-18, 10 P.3d 346 (holding challenge to 
sufficiency of evidence must be preserved in the trial court). However, at the close of the 
State's case-in-chief, defendant made a cursory motion for a directed verdict as to all 
three counts, which the trial court denied. R198:242-43, 250. Consequently, the claim is 
preserved, albeit marginally. See Aple. Br. at p.9 n.4. 
2 
dismiss the charges on the ground that he was entrapped. R75-73. The court denied the 
motion. R95-94. A jury found defendant guilty of all charges. R162-61. Following the 
verdict, defendant moved to merge count 2 with count 1. R 199:42-43. The court granted the 
motion. R 199:43. The trial court sentenced defendant to a statutory five-year-to-life term 
for operating a clandestine drug lab and a statutory zero-to-five-year term for unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance, the sentences to run concurrently. Rl 87-85. Defendant 
timely appealed. R193. The Utah Supreme Court poured the case over to this Court. R194. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS3 
Michael Patrick met defendant for the first time on or before March 12, 2003, at 
Patrick's neighbor's house in Hamilton Park. R198:65-69. Defendant approached Patrick 
and asked him if he could get some red phosphorus from which defendant would make some 
methamphetamine. R198:59-60, 69-70. Although he had never met defendant, Patrick 
surmised that defendant probably approached him for the methamphetamine precursor 
because Patrick's appearance—longer hair, missing teeth—suggested that he might be 
associated with the methamphetamine culture. R198:70,125. Patrick replied that he "might 
be able to [get some red phosphorus]" and that "[he']d see what [he] could do." R198:70-71. 
Patrick had worked as a confidential informant for the Iron County Narcotics Task 
Force. R198:66, 176-77. On the day defendant approached him, Patrick called his 
supervising officer, Cedar City Police Sergeant Darin Adams, reported his encounter with 
3
 The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. 
Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1115 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
3 
defendant, and asked for instructions on how to proceed. R198:70-72,174,176. Following 
Adams' instructions, Patrick called defendant and told him that he would be able to provide 
the red phosphorous, if defendant was still interested. R198:72, 177. Defendant answered 
affirmatively and stated that if Patrick could get him some of the red phosphorus he would 
make some methamphetamine with it. R198:72-73. 
Patrick immediately called Sergeant Adams, who directed him to arrange a meeting 
with defendant in the Wal-Mart parking lot. R198:73, 178. A day or two later, Patrick 
informed defendant of these arrangements. R198:73. The next evening, March 17, 2003, 
Sergeant Adams placed a bag containing 3/4 pound of red phosphorus in a garbage can at 
Patrick's house. R198:73-74, 178, 192. Two officers were assigned to keep constant 
surveillance to make sure the can was not tampered with. R198:178. An electronic listening 
device was hidden in Patrick's car. R198:74-75,178. Patrick then called defendant and told 
defendant to meet him in the parking lot. R198:74. 
Earlier on March 17, sometime before 5:00 p.m., defendant had approached his 
probation officer, Todd Mitchell, and proposed that defendant could set up one Jeff 
Campbell, a known methamphetamine cook, by offering Campbell a precursor to produce 
methamphetamine. R198:227, 231, 233. Mitchell immediately contacted Iron County 
Sheriff's Officer Dale Schlosser, who joined defendant and Mitchell to discuss defendant's 
proposal. R198:2:06-07,209-10,232. In this meeting, defendant proposed the same plan to 
Officer Schlosser, but he said he did not yet know the name of a supplier of the precursor. 
R198:209. Officer Schlosser told defendant that the Sheriffs Office could not act unless 
4 
defendant provided a name. Id. Officer Schlosser did not authorize defendant to purchase 
any precursor chemicals or to work for the Task Force: defendant was not asked to fill out 
the relevant paperwork preliminary to being authorized as a confidential informant; he was 
"absolutely not" authorized to work for the Task Force as a confidential informant on May 
17,2003; and he was not authorized to make any controlled buy. R198:185,210-13. Rather, 
because Officer Schlosser knew that defendant would receive a controlled delivery later that 
day through Patrick, acting as a confidential informant, he merely listened to defendant. 
R198:210. At about 5:15 pm, after he had left Mitchell's office, defendant called Mitchell 
and asked to clarify on what defendant could do. R198:233. Mitchell again told defendant 
"specifically he couldn' t do anything without calling me first or calling [Officer Schlosser]." 
Id. Notwithstanding that admonition and that he had not been authorized as a confidential 
informant, defendant failed to disclose that he intended to buy red phosphorous and produce 
methamphetamine later that very day. R198:223,233-34. He merely indicated he would try 
to find out the supplier's name. R198:223. 
Defendant met Patrick, as planned, and they drove to Patrick's house. R198:75,178. 
En route, defendant bragged about his ability to run and simultaneously disguise his 
methamphetamine lab so effectively that his probation officers had been unaware of it during 
their visits to his home. R74-76. Defendant also named some of the chemicals he used to 
make methamphetamine—ephedrine, red phosphorus, iodine—and stated that he could 
usually produce it in a single night. R198:76, 178-79. After they retrieved the red 
phosphorus from the garbage can, defendant said he would use it to cook "a batch" and, in 
5 
exchange, produce an "8-ball"—three and one-half grams—of methamphetamine, which 
Patrick could pick up at defendant's work place the next day. R198:76-78, 178. Sergeant 
Adams confirmed hearing defendant's conversation with Patrick with the listening device. 
R198:179,181. Patrick and defendant then drove back to the Wal-Mart parking lot, where, 
after defendant left, Patrick met with Sergeant Adams. R.198:78, 178, 81. 
Defendant was tracked in his vehicle to his residence, where he was arrested. 
R198:181-82, 203, 213. Voluntarily waiving his Miranda rights, defendant admitted to 
Sergeant Adams that he accompanied Patrick to retrieve the red phosphorus, but that he 
assembled "a lab" inside his house to "set someone else up." R198:203-04. Police executed 
a search warrant for defendant's home that night and the next day. R198:100-01,117. There 
they found an operational methamphetamine lab, evidenced by approximately 30 items used 
in and arranged for the manufacture of methamphetamine: flares with striker caps (which 
contain red phosphorus), glassware in the form of a separatory funnel, solvents, acids, bases, 
unknown liquids, heating elements, coffee filters, tubing with a white residue, a pH kit, 
pseudoephedrine tablets, an empty can of denatured alcohol, lye, and hydrochloric acid. 
R198-.107-13, 116-21, 124-31, 133-39, 143-51, 159-61, 164-70, 188-89, 214-16; State's 
Exhibits 3, 5-7, 10, 13, 14, 18, 20, 23, 27-32, 36; R166-164 (Addendum B). Among these 
items were two precursors of methamphetamine—red phosphorus (hidden in a filmcannister) 
and pseudoephedrine in liquid form—and methamphetamine in liquid form. R198:125-28, 
133-38,164-65,170; State's Ex. 18, 27-30, 32. Police also found evidence of consumption 
of controlled substances, including tin foil containing burnt residue, a spoon with residue, 
6 
rolling papers, a syringe, a butane fuel cannister, and cotton balls. R198:l 10-15,118,122, 
124,129; State's Exhibits 4, 8, 9,12,15,17,19, 22; R166-165. They also found controlled 
substances, including methamphetamine. R198:169; State's Exhibits 16; R166. These items 
were found primarily in the kitchen, but also throughout the house. R107, 114, 116, 118, 
119, 126, 130-31, 143, 152, 221. Defendant's house measured 57 feet from another 
residence. R198:202. 
Defendant claimed that all of his actions were solely to entice one Jeff Campbell to 
buy red phosphorus to cook methamphetamine, which he hoped would lead to Campbell's 
arrest. R256-60. He claimed on direct examination that Mitchell told him to "just do the 
deal and leave the legal aspects of the deal up to him." R 198:260. He claimed that most of 
the items found in his home were just household supplies. R198:263-64. Other, more 
incriminating items, like red phosphorus and pseudoephedrine, were intended to make his 
methamphetamine lab appear genuine, so as to lure Campbell to cook the controlled 
substance in his home. R198:264-65. He claimed that he left the Task Force's office with 
their permission to "cross the line between right and wrong." R198:268. 
On cross-examination, defendant acknowledged that Officer Schlosser did not 
authorize him to act as a confidential informant. R198:275. He acknowledged that Mitchell 
told him "not to do anything." R198:279,286. He acknowledged that when he unexpectedly 
received the red phosphorus that he "proceeded without authorization." R298:279-80,286. 
Although he claimed that there were not enough parts of a lab in his house to cook 
methamphetamine, when confronted with the fact that tested, finished 
7 
product—methamphetamine—was found in his house, defendant, without further 
explanation, acquiesced in the criminal lab's report. R198:280-81; State's Ex. 32. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant was not entrapped into buying red phosphorous from a police informant, 
but merely afforded an opportunity to commit the offenses. Not only did the police act 
minimally through the confidential informant, but defendant also initiated and thereafter 
implemented the illegal actions that led to his arrest and convictions. Though defendant did 
speak with the police about the possibility of his becoming a confidential informant, he was 
never authorized to act as such and he was repeatedly advised by two police officers to not 
act in any way without their authorization. Nevertheless, defendant still proceeded to buy 
red phosphorus. Utah cases dealing with the defense of entrapment have never recognized 
it in circumstances similar to this case and have even refused to find it in a number of cases 
where the illegal transaction was proposed by law enforcement or a person known to the 
defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE POLICE DID NOT ENTRAP 
DEFENDANT INTO POSSESSING BOTH METHAMPHETAMINE 
AND A METHAMPHETAMINE LABORATORY 
Defendant does not argue that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of 
possession of a clandestine drug laboratory or of unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance. Defendant asserts only that the officers' failure to inform him of their knowledge 
of the planned transfer of red phosphorus "created a substantial risk that the offense would 
8 
be committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it" by "allow [ing] him to walk into a 
trap." Aplt. Br. at 6. Offering minimal discussion and no relevant authority, defendant 
merely asserts repeatedly that police conduct was "clear[ly]" below proper standards and 
"[cjommon feelings." Id. at 7-8. 
"To prove the defense of entrapment, the evidence must be sufficient to raise 'a 
reasonable doubt that [the defendant] freely and voluntarily committed the offense.'" State 
v. 7brray,2000UT 100,18,16P.3d 1242 (quoting State v. Udell,72$P2d 131,132 (Utah)). 
The appellate court views the evidence of entrapment "in the light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict." Udell, 728 P.2d at 132. 
The defense of entrapment is set forth in UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-303 (West 2004). 
That section provides as follows: 
It is a defense that the actor was entrapped into committing the offense. 
Entrapment occurs when a peace officer or a person directed by or acting in 
cooperation with the officer induces the commission of an offense in order to 
obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution by methods creating a 
substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not otherwise 
ready to commit it. Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to 
commit an offense does not constitute entrapment. 
Id. at §76-2-303(1). 
In State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court held that the 
determination of entrapment under the statute must be made using an objective standard. 
Taylor, 599 P.2d at 499-500. The objective standard "focuses solely on police conduct, 
rather than on the defendant's predisposition to commit a crime." Torres, 2000 UT 100, f 
8 (citing Taylor, 599 P.2d at 500). Thus, "[i]f the police conduct creates a substantial risk 
9 
that an otherwise law abiding person would be induced to commit a crime, entrapment has 
occurred " State v. Wright, 744 P.2d 315, 318 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citation omitted). 
See also State v. Richardson, 843 P.2d 517, 520 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (entrapment defense 
available where "an ordinary person in defendant's situation would be induced to commit 
crime"). 
Applying the objective standard, the Utah Supreme Court has identified two general 
categories of entrapment situations: (1 inducement "based on improper police conduct" and 
(2) inducement "based primarily on sympathy, pity, or close personal friendship, or offers of 
inordinate sums of money." Torres, 2000 UT 100, f 9 (citations omitted). Defendant 
repeatedly alleges only the former. Aplt. Br. at 6-8. 
Cases in this state finding entrapment due to improper police conduct have required 
either persistent and repeated police pressure to commit an offense or at very least a total lack 
of evidence suggesting that the defendant would have engaged in the activity absent that 
pressure. See State v. Sprague, 680 P.2d 404, 406 (Utah 1984) (undercover officer 
approached the defendant three times without reason to believe that he would buy or sell 
drugs); State v. Kourbelas, 621 P.2d 1238, 1240 (Utah 1980) (officer contacted defendant 
to sell marijuana at least five times over the course of several weeks). 
Police conduct in this case was minimal, demonstrably different from that in Sprague 
and Kourbelas, and not improper. After hearing from Patrick that defendant sought to obtain 
red phosphorus, Sergeant Adams told Patrick, who only at that point began to act as a 
confidential informant, to tell defendant that the red phosphorus could be supplied. R198:70-
10 
72, 174, 176-77. After hearing from Patrick of defendant's continued interest, Sergeant 
Adams supplied the red phosphorus. R198:73-74, 178, 192. After Patrick arranged a 
meeting, defendant and he retrieved the red phosphorus. R198:74-78. After tracking 
defendant to his residence, the police arrested him. R198:181-82, 203, 213. Such minimal 
police involvement in defendant's actions hardly constitutes entrapment. Sprague, 680 
P.2dat 406; Kourbelas, 621 P.2d at 1240. 
Nevertheless, defendant asserts that "the Task Force did not inform [him that] it was 
working against him" "using an informant and a proposed transaction" about which 
"[defendant] himself had approached the Task Force... [while] seeking to work/br the Task 
Force." Aplt. Br. at 6. Consequently, he argues, the Task Force "created a substantial risk 
that the offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it." Id. (citing 
section 76-2-303(1)). This conduct, defendant argues, "'falls below standards to which 
common feelings respond for the proper use of governmental power." Aplt. Br. at 7 (quoting 
State v. Byrns, 911 P.2d 981,988 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), quoting State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d at 
500)). 
This argument is without merit. In Byrns, this Court held that Byrns was not 
entrapped because "defendant demonstrated] his willingness and eagerness" to set up a 
methamphetamine lab." Byrns, 911 P.2d at 988. Defendant cites no other case relative to 
the fact situation in this case. Thus, defendant's argument is unsupported by authority. 
More importantly, defendant's argument neglects crucial facts. The police targeted 
defendant because he initiated the sequence of events that led to his arrest when he 
11 
approached Patrick to obtain a precursor for methamphetamine manufacture. R198:69-72, 
174,176. Defendant cites no authority to support an argument that his subsequent offer to 
assist the police in a sting of his own creation supplanted reasonable police action or imposed 
a duty on police to warn him of the consequences of illegal activity that he had previously 
initiated. Defendant's argument becomes even more groundless where defendant failed to 
inform the police of his planned activities, was repeatedly cautioned not to act without 
authorization, and acknowledged that he was never authorized to act as a confidential 
informant. R198:185, 210-13, 223, 233. On this evidence, no reasonable juror would have 
found that the police induced defendant to go forward with actions that would otherwise be 
illegal. Stated differently, it was not police misconduct that resulted in defendant's arrest, 
but the inherent danger in defendant's angling to "burn" a fellow methamphetamine cook. 
Defendant was simply, justly "hoist by his own petar[d]." WTLLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET 
Act III Scene iv. 
The objective standard focuses on police conduct. "Entrapment however, has not 
occurred if a law enforcement officer merely affords a person an opportunity to commit the 
offense." Id. (citation omitted). "'[W]here it is known or suspected that a person is engaged 
in criminal activities, or is desiring to do so, it is not an entrapment to provide an opportunity 
for such person to carry out his criminal intentions."' Torres, 2000 UT 100, ff 12, 14 
(rejecting claim of entrapment where the defendant "initiated and continued to pursue contact 
with police informant") (quoting State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d 744, 746 (Utah 1975)). 
Torres presents a factual scenario dispositive of defendant's claim of entrapment. 
12 
Torres came to the confidential informant's residence to discuss a drug transaction with 
another individual residing there. Torres, 2000 UT 100, f 2. The confidential informant 
called an undercover agent and told him that defendant was a "big mover of drugs." Id. 
Within a month after they initially met, the confidential informant visited defendant at his 
home six times. Id. atf3. During each visit, the confidential informant and Torres spoke 
about purchasing and transporting drugs. Id. Shortly afterward, the confidential informant 
tried to buy heroin from Torres. Id. at f 4. When Torres was unable to obtain the heroin, a 
new deal was arranged for the sale of a pound of methamphetamine. Id. When Torres and 
his cohorts delivered the methamphetamine, he was arrested. Id. at f 6. 
The Utah Supreme Court rejected Torres' argument that his entrapment was based on 
"deception" that was "inherently unfair." Id. at f 13. The court recognized that because 
drug dealing is "by its very nature secretive," "there is always an element of deception in 
entrapment cases." Id. The court nevertheless concluded, "because of defendant's 
independent and persistent attempts [to supply illegal drugs], we find that his actions were 
'freely and voluntarily committed,' and thus were not induced by the informant's conduct." 
Id. at f 14. (citation omitted). "Instead, the informant's conduct merely provided defendant 
an opportunity to carry out his criminal intentions." Id. "Therefore, the evidence of 
entrapment did not create a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt as a matter of law 
. . . . " Id. 
Here, as in Torres, the police merely afforded defendant the opportunity to carry out 
his criminal intentions where he evidently had an independent desire "to engag[e] in criminal 
13 
activities." Torres, 2000 UT 100, f 14. Defendant acknowledged that he approached Patrick 
and made an unsolicited request to obtain red phosphorus, a chemical precursor to 
methamphetamine. R198:59-60,69-70. See Aplt. Br. at 3. Patrick responded to defendant's 
request a few days later, informing defendant that he could obtain the red phosphorus, if 
defendant was still interested. R198:72. Defendant answered affirmatively and stated that 
if Patrick could get him some red phosphorus he would make some methamphetamine with 
it. R 198:72-73. A day or two later, defendant met Patrick, and together they retrieved the 
red phosphorus from Patrick's garbage can. R198:75-76. En route to Patrick's house, 
defendant bragged about how effectively he disguised his methamphetamine lab. R74-76. 
After defendant was arrested, police found an operational methamphetamine lab, 
methamphetamine precursors—red phosphorus and pseudoephedrine—and 
methamphetamine in liquid and powder form in defendant's house. R198:126-28,133-38, 
164-66, 170, 188-89, 214-16; State's Ex. 16, 18, 27-30, 32. Apart from defendant's 
undisputed initiation of and participation in the arrangement to obtain red phosphorus, the 
massiveness of the evidence found in defendant's home establishes that defendant was 
manufacturing methamphetamine long before he was allegedly "trap[ped]" by police into 
setting up another individual. 
Finally, Utah courts have never expanded the defense of entrapment to include 
circumstances similar to this case and have even refused to apply it to circumstances in 
which, in contradistinction to the facts of this case, officers or friends of the defendant have 
proposed the illegal action. See J.D.W., 910 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (no 
14 
entrapment as a matter of law where police officer approached randomly targeted juvenile 
with offer to sell marijuana); State v. Beddoes, 890 P.2d 1, 3-4 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (no 
entrapment where police used friend of defendant to propose a marijuana sale); State 
v.Wynia, 754 P.2d 667, 668-70 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (no entrapment where undercover 
female officer encountered the defendant in a social setting, initiated request for contraband, 
and had no prior suspicion of his disposition to sell marijuana). 
In sum, viewed most favorably to the jury's verdict, this evidence was more than 
sufficient to show that defendant was independently willing and eager to commit the offenses 
and that he was not entrapped. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that defendant's 
convictions be affirmed. 
15 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
The State requests oral argument. "[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the appellate 
court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals, 2005 UT 18, 
f 10, 110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between the litigant and the 
bench." Moles v. Regents of University of California, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557, 560 (Cal. 1982). 
In the case at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided by oral argument." 
Utah R. App. P. 29(a). 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /<& day of November, 2005. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
KENNETH* A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
16 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee 
were mailed, postage prepaid, to Randle C. Allen, Barnes & Allen, LLP, attorneys for 
defendant, Depot Plaza, 415 N. Main, Suite 303, Cedar City, UT 84720, this / ^ of 
November, 2005. 
17 
ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
UTAH-CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT 
§ 5 8 - 3 7 - 8 , Prohibited acts—Penalties 
(1) Prohibited acts A—Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled of counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, 
offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distrib-
ute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person 'participates, directs, or engages in conduct which 
results in any violation of any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 
37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more 
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate 
occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or more persons with 
respect,to whom the person occupies a position of organizer, supervisor, 
or any other position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a controlled substance 
analog, or gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule III is guilty of a 
second degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty 
o£ a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of 
a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty 
of a second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A misde-
meanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third 
degree felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection 
(l)(a)(ii) or (iii) maj be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term 
as provided by law, but-if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in 
Section 76-10-501 was' used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his 
immediate possession during the commission or imfurtherance of the offense, 
the"" court shall additionally sentence the person Convicted for a term of one 
year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may addition-
ally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not^to exceed 
five years to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first 
degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not 
lesslthan seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or execution of 
<the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for 
probation. 
(2) Prohibited facts B—Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance^ analog or a controlled substance, unless it was ob-
tained under a valid prescription oi order, direcriy from a practitioner 
while acting "in the course of his professional practice, or 'as otherwise 
authorized by this chapter;' 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control ot any building, 
room, tenement/ vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and 
intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully possess-
ing, using, or distributing controlled substances in any of those locations; 
or 
i (in) forfany person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or 
forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second 
degree felony; j 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is 
more than 16 ounces, but less than1 100 pounds, or a controlled substance 
analog, is guilty of a/third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin 
from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but less 
than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(xz) ,Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any controlled 
substance by a person, that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater 
penalty than provided in this Subsection (2). 
(d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other 
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), includ-
ing less than one ounce of marijuana^ is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A1 misdemeanor, and 
upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is guilty of a third degree 
felony,. 
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the 
exterioi boundaries of property occupied by any I correctional facility as 
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in Subsec-
tion (2)(b), and if the ^onviction^ is with respect to controlled substances as 
listed in: 
(i) Subsection (2)(b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for 
an indeterminate term as provided by law, and:r 
U (A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term 
of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
\ (B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for 'an 
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not 
concurrently; and 
(ii) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to, imprisonment for 
an indeterminate term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally 
sentence the person convicted to, a term of six months to run consecutively 
and not concurrently. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is: 
'(i}f/on a first conviction, guilty of a class B^  misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor;* and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a, third degree felony. 
.offense not amounting tp a violation of Section 76-5-207; 
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentioually haying in 
his body any measurable amount of a controlled substance; and 
(iij) operates a motor, vehicle -as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a negli-
gent manner, causing serious bodily injury as defined in Section 76-1-601 
-or the death of anothen 
(3) Prohibited acts C—Penalties; 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally^ 
fi (i) to use krthe course of the-manufacturer distribution of a controlled 
subs tance^ license number" which'is fictitious/revoked, suspended, or 
issued to another person or, for >tfle- purpose of obtaining-& controlled 
substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to be, a manufactur-
er, wholesaler, .apothecary, physician*, dentist, veterinarian; or.othes au-
thorized person; 
(n) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure 
the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense 
to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or 
to procure the .administration of any controlled substance by misrepresen-
tation or failure by the, person to disclose his receiving any controlled 
substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alter-
ation of a prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or the 
use of a false name or addressp 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter a^ny prescription for 
written order issued or written under the^ terms of this chapter;» or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch* die, plate, stone, or Qther 
thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, tfade name, 
or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any likeness of 
any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling so a§ to, render 
any drug a counterfeit controlled substance^ 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty pi a third 
degree felony*-
(4) Prohibited acts D—Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not author-
ized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under 
this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act> or'under 
Title 58, Chapter 37b,r Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is upon convic-
tion subject to the penalties and classifications under this Subsection (4) if 
the trier of fact finds the act is committed4 
(l) in a public or pnvate elementary* or secondary school or on the 
grounds of any of those schools; 
(n) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution 
or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
^ (iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure 
or grounds which are, at the time of the act,' being nsed for an activity 
sponsored by or through a school or institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i) 
and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in or. on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 
76-10-501; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena^theater, movie 
house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
1
" (viiiy in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet^of any structure! facility, or grounds included in 
Subsections (4j((a)(i) thrdugh (vm); 
w AII uic jLiiuneaiaie presence ot a person younger than 18 years oi^  age, 
regardless of where the act occurs; or 
(xi)JortHe purpose of facilitating; arranging, or causing the transport, 
delivery, 6r distributioiicbfv^n substance in" violation of'this section to ah 
inmate or on the ground's of aiiy correctional facility as defined iii Section 
76-8-3 If.3. ' ' 
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree 
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term»of not less than five* years* if the 
penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsection 
would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of the 
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would 
have been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person 
convicted under Subsection (2)(g) or this Subsection (4) is guilty of one 
degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(d)(i) If the violation is of Subsection (4)(a)(xi): 
(A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate 
term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the 
person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and not 
concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for 'an 
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not 
concurrently; and 
(ii) the penalties under this Subsection (4)(d) apply also to any person 
who, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an 
offense, directly or indirectly solicits, requests, commands, coerces, encour-
ages, or intentionally aids another person to commit a violation of Subsec-
tion (4)(a)(xi). 
(e) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the 
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the 
time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the 
actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred was not as 
described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location where the act 
occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B 
misdemeanor. 
(6)(a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and 
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of 
another slate, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another 
state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which 
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or 
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that the 
person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance or 
substances. 
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the 
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, 
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the^ sub-
stances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and 
supervision. 
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who manu-
factures, distributes, or possesses ari imitation controlled substance for use as 
a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the 
for;dinaiy course of professional practice or research; or 
(b)n any law-enforcement officer acting in tne course and legitimate scope 
of his employment. 
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to 
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the'remainder of this chapter shall 
be 'given effect without the invalid provision or application] 
CLANDESTINE DRUG LAB ACT 
§ 5 8 - 3 7 d - 4 . Prohibited acts—Second degree felony 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally: 
(a) possess a controlled substance precursor with the intent to engage in a 
clandestine laboratory operation; 
(b) possess laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent to engage in a 
clandestine laboratory operation; 
(c) sell, distribute, or otherwise supply a precursor chemical,, laboratory 
equipment, or laboratory supplies knowing or having reasonable cause to 
believe it will be used for a clandestine laboratory operation; 
(d) evade recordkeeping provisions of Title 58, Chapter 37c, Utah Con-
trolled Substance Precursor Act, or the regulations issued under that act, 
loiowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the material distributed 
or received will be used for a clandestine laboratory operation; 
(e) conspire with or aid another to engage in a clandestine laboratory 
operation; 
(f) produce or manufacture, or possess with intent to produce or manufac-
ture a controlled or counterfeit substance except as authorized under Title 58, 
Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act; 
(g) transport or convey a controlled or counterfeit substance with the 
intent to distribute or to be distributed by the person transporting or convey-
ing the controlled or counterfeit substance or by any other person regardless 
of whether the final destination for the distribution is within this state or any 
other location; or 
(h) engage in compounding, synthesis, concentration, purification, separa-
tion, extraction, or other physical or chemical processing of any substance, 
including a controlled substance precursor, or the packaging, repackaging, 
labeling, or relabeling of a container holding a substance that is a product of 
any of these activities, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the 
substance is a product of any of these activities and will be used in the illegal 
manufacture of specified controlled substances. 
(2) A person who violates" any provision of Subsection (1) is guilty of a second 
degree felony. 
§ 58—37d~5. Prohibited acts—First degree felony 
(1) A person who violates Subsection 5 8-3 7d-4(l)(a), (b), (e), (f), or (h) is 
guilty of a first degree felony if the trier of fact also finds any one of the 
following conditions occurred in conjunction with that violation: 
(a) possession of a firearm; 
(b)4 use of a booby trap; 
(c) illegal possession, transportation, or disposal of hazardous or danger*, 
ous material or while transporting or causing to be transported materials in 
furthefaiice of a clandestine laboratory ^ operation, there was created a sub-
stantial risk to human health >pv safety or a danger to the environment-
al) intended laboratory operation was to take place
 foi\ did, takq place 
^ithin 500 feet of a residence,"plice of business, church, or schools 
(e) clandestine^ laboratory operation actually 'produced, any amount1 of: a. 
specified controlled^substance; or 
h (f) intended clandestine laboratory operation was for the fprpductiorf 'of 
cobaihe base or methamphetamine base. 
(2) If the trier of fact finds that two or more of the conditions' listed* in 
Subsectfbris^(iy(a) through (f) of this section occurred in conjunction with the 
violation, at sentencing for the first degree felony: 
(a) probation shall hot be granted: 
(b) the execution or ^ imposition or seiitence snail not be suspended; and 
(c) the court shall not enter a judgment for a lower category of offense^ 
Laws 1992, c. 156, § 5; Laws 1997, c. 64, § 12! eff May 5, 1997; Laws 1W8, c 65, §"1, 
eff May 4, 1998, Laws 2000, a 187, § 1, eff. May 1, 2000; Laws 2003, c J15, § 3, efL 
May 5, 2003. 
CRIMINAL CODE 
§ 7 6 - 2 - 3 0 3 . Entrapment 
(1) It is a defense that the actor was entrapped into committing the offense. 
Entrapment occurs when a peace officer or a person directed by or acting in 
cooperation with the officer induces the commission of an offense in order to 
obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution by methods creating a 
substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready 
to commit it. Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an 
offense does not constitute entrapment. 
(2) The defense of entrapment shall be unavailable when causing or threaten-
ing bodily injury is an element of the offense charged and the prosecution is 
based on conduct causing or threatening the injury to a person other than the 
person perpetrating the entrapment. 
(3) The defense provided by this section is available even though the actor 
denies commission of the conduct charged to constitute the offense. 
(4) Upon written motion of the defendant, the court shall hear evidence on 
the issue and shall determine as a matter of fact and law whether the defendant 
was entrapped to commit the offense. Defendant's motion shall be made at 
least ten days before trial except the court for good cause shown may permit a 
later filing. 
(5) Should the court determine that the defendant was entrapped, it shall 
dismiss the case with prejudice, but if the court determines the defendant was 
not entrapped, such issue may be presented by the defendant to the jury at trial. 
Any order by the court dismissing a case based on entrapment shall be 
appealable by the state. 
(6) In any hearing before a judge or jury where the defense of entrapment is 
an issue, past offenses of the defendant shall not be admitted except that in a 
trial where the defendant testifies he may be asked of his past convictions for 
felonies and any testimony given by the defendant at a hearing on entrapment 
may be used to impeach his testimony at trial. 
ADDENDUM B 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT- CEDAR 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH | EXHIBIT LIST 
Plaintiff 
vs. I 
Case No: 031500329 
HOWARD RAYMOND RICE | Judge: J. PHILIP EVES 
Defendant Date: May 27, 2004 
I 
RANDALL C ALLEN Attorney for the Defendant 
SCOTT F GARRETT Attorney for the Plaintiff 
TROY LITTLE Attorney for the Plaintiff 
JEFFERY E SLACK Attorney for the Plaintiff 
BRIAN C STEED Attorney for the Plaintiff 
NO. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
PARTY 
P-l 
P-2 
P-3 
P-4 
P-5 
P-6 
P-7 
P-8 
P-9 
P-10 
P-ll 
P-12 
P-13 
P-14 
DESCRIPTION 
Red Phosphorous 
Chart w/Photographs of Rice Home 
Road Fusee 
Foil/Unknown Substance 
Coffee Filters/Yellow Stain 
Red Powder Cloth 
Tubing 
Spoon 
"Tops" Rolling Papers 
Tubing w/White Residue 
Receipts 
Syringe 
Tubing w/Black Stopper 
PH Kit 
OFF 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
REC REF WDN ADV SUB 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
15 P-15 Butane Fuel Can Y Y 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT- CEDAR 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH | EXHIBIT LIST 
Plaintiff 
vs. | 
Case No: 031500329 
HOWARD RAYMOND RICE | Judge: J. PHILIP EVES 
Defendant Date: May 27, 2 0 04 
l 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
P-16 
P-17 
P-18 
P-19 
P-20 
P-21 
P-22 
P-23 
P-24 
P-25 
P-26 
P-27 
P-28 
P-29 
P-30 
P-31 
P-32 
Baggie 
"Tops" Rolling Papers 
Film Canis ;ter/Red Phosphorous 
Syringe Cap & Cotton Ball 
Sudo Tablets 
Address Book 
"Bugler" Rolling Papers 
Filters 
Roach 
Red Devil Lye 
"Hamm's" Can 
Sample of 
Sample of 
Sample of 
Sample of 
Sample of 
Sample of 
Unknown Liquid 
Unknown Liquid 
Unknown Liquid 
Red Devil Lye Can 
Unknown Liquid 
Unknown Liquid 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
33 P-33 Crime Lab Report Y Y 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT- CEDAR 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH | EXHIBIT LIST 
Plaintiff 
vs. | 
Case No: 031500329 
HOWARD RAYMOND RICE | Judge: J. PHILIP EVES 
Defendant Date: May 27, 2004 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
P-34 
P-35 
P-36 
P-37 
P-38 
P-39 
Chain of Custody Report 
Crime Lab Report/Fingerprint 
Hydrogen Peroxide 
Diagram of the Rice Home 
Lab Report 
Photographs 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
May 27, 2004 
signature 
OFF = Offered 
REC = Received 
REF = Refused 
WDN = Withdrawn 
ADV = Under Advisement 
SUB = Original Substituted 
